We review different (generic) conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships. Their logical relationship is explored. Two kinds of conditions are considered. However, the property for an action profile to be "compatible" plays a crucial role in both kinds. Also, two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition.
Introduction
Looking at the theory of mechanism design, and the derivation of individual incentives for the participants to a collective organization, the first methodological distinction concerns the different types of informational limitations. This is the distinction between moral hazard, caused by the imperfect observability of actions, and adverse selection, resulting from private holding of relevant information by the individual actors. This first distinction is standard in game theory, where uncertainty about the players' decisions is treated differently from the uncertainty about states of nature.
But there is another distinction, also methodologically important, between two different technical approaches to deriving incentive compatible mechanisms. One is the "differential approach" (using the terminology of Laffont and Maskin, 1980) which, assuming sufficient regularity, consists of solving the differential system associated with the individual optimization first order conditions. The other one, which may be called the "linear approach" and that we will take here, assumes sufficient separability and treats the individual incentive problems as systems of linear inequalities. This second approach was taken first to handle adverse selection in the design of collectively optimal public-decision mechanisms (d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1979) and in the design of optimal selling rules for a discriminating monopolist (Crémer and McLean, 1985) . More recently, it has been used to solve moral hazard problems both in static partnerships (Legros and Matsushima, 1991) , 1 with the team joint output assumed to be stochastic, and in repeated partnerships (Fudenberg et al., 1994 ), 2 to obtain various "folk theorems" and the possibility for efficiency to be approximated with sufficiently low discounting. In this recent work, adopting the linear approach, two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition. In a repetitive situation, transferability is obtained through accumulation of payoffs over time: The recursive structure of the dynamic game, and the extended application of the optimality principle of dynamic programming, allow for the decomposition of equilibrium payoffs into "present-period" payoffs and "continuation" payoffs. The continuation payoffs play in the dynamic framework the role played by the transfers in the static framework. Now, whether in the static or in the dynamic framework, the conditions that are imposed on the probabilistic outcome function to enforce partnership under moral hazard (whether through transfers or repetition) are analogous to other conditions, already used in previous models of adverse selection to restrict the individual probabilistic beliefs. Our purpose here is to review these various conditions and exploit this analogy systematically. This review will be done in a model of team moral hazard, but capitalizing on results obtained in the adverse selection case. Logical relations between these various conditions will be clarified.
The moral hazard problem is well illustrated in the simplest model of team production, where a set of agents (the partners) have each to choose an action at some cost or disutility. Output, as measured in monetary units, is a function of individual actions. It should be shared among the partners, and, to ensure participation, no one should be losing. There is moral hazard (or imperfect monitoring) when actions are not perfectly observable and the sharing rule cannot be directly based on them. Then, as often observed, there are situations where noncooperative behavior prevents the team from producing the collectively optimal level of output, whatever the proposed rule to fully share the total output. This inefficiency of partnership due to moral hazard has been well argued by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) for deterministic outcome functions and was formalized by Holmstrom (1982) under simple regularity conditions. Moreover, even when partnership is repeated and outcome is stochastic, a negative conclusion may be maintained. In the two-agent example developed by Radner et al. (1986) , there are two possible observable outcomes 3 -high or low output -each having positive probabilities whatever the agents do (work or shirk). Since any agent choosing to work increases the probability of high output, it is collectively efficient in expected (and discounted) payoff terms that both agents work. But, every equilibrium payoff, and the associated sharing of the surplus, is uniformly bounded away from the efficiency frontier, whatever the discount rate.
As already suggested in Holmstrom (1982) , there are two possible ways to avoid these negative conclusions. One is the possibility of exploiting the informational properties of the outcome function (particularly when it is stochastic), the other is the possibility of weakening efficiency into an approximate-efficiency requirement. The possibility of obtaining the first best by exploiting the stochastic character of the outcome function is first demonstrated by Williams and Radner (1994) 4 and then pursued in the work of Legros and Matsushima quoted above. The possibility given by the weakening of efficiency is clearly presented by Legros and Matthews (1993) for deterministic outcome functions and is further exploited by Fudenberg et al. (1994) , who combine the two possibilities in looking at stochastic outcome functions. These two papers show that efficiency can be approximated by using mixed strategy equilibria (as an alternative way to make the outcome stochastic). Accordingly, in the following, we shall distinguish between two kinds of conditions, some ensuring enforceability of the desired actions exactly, others ensuring only their approximation by mixed strategy equilibria. These two kinds of conditions will appear complementary. The first kind of conditions will be shown to hold generically, leaving however many meaningful cases uncovered, and to be recaptured by the second kind of conditions. Examples are the classical subscription game for the production of a public good or the stochastic Cournot oligopoly model of Green and Porter (1984) . Of course, other cases, such as the two-agent example developed by Radner et al. (1986) , will remain uncovered (due essentially to the lack of observable outcomes).
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the partnership model is presented. In Section 3, the linear approach is introduced and, restricting to transferable utilities, transfer schemes are used as enforcement mechanisms. Conditions of the two kinds are presented and analyzed. In Section 4, the same approach and the same two kinds of conditions are used, but without transferability, and with repetition playing the role of enforcement mechanism.
A model of partnership
Formally, the "team moral hazard problem" may be defined as an elementary game in normal form. A "team" consists of a set N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n} of "partners" (or players), each having to choose simultaneously an action a i in a set A i . For simplicity we take this set to be finite. A vector
There is a set X of public outcomes, also assumed finite, and a stochastic outcome function. This is a function associating with each action profile a ∈ A a probability distribution p(· | a) on the set X. With each partner i is associated a utility function u i (x, a i ) defined 5 on X × A i . The payoff of partner i can be computed as the expectation
Allowing the players to randomize over their actions, we denote by α i a mixed action of partner i that is a probability distribution on A i , and byÂ i the set of all mixed actions of player i. Letting α i (a i ) be the probability assigned to action a i by a mixed action α i and considering a mixed action profile α ∈Â = × n i=1Â i , the corresponding probability of the action profile a is given by the product
The support of α i is the set S(
For a mixed action profile α ∈Â, the payoff of player i is
5. As will be mentioned, some of our results will apply to the more general case where ui is defined on X × A.
In this elementary game an action profile a * is collectively efficient if there is no other action profile a such that, for every i, U i (a) ≥ U i (a * ), with at least one inequality holding strictly (a * and a may be respectively replaced by α * and α if we allow for mixed actions).
In such a game, one cannot expect in general that an efficient action profile (or any other action profile) be directly enforceable as a noncooperative equilibrium, in the Nash sense, whereby no player could increase his payoff by a unilateral deviation from the given efficient action profile. The main objective is then to enforce an action profile (efficient or not) as a noncooperative equilibrium indirectly, by designing some mechanism based on the publicly observed outcome and not on the individual actions. Introducing such a mechanism amounts to modifying the elementary game. As mentioned in the Introduction, two types of enforcement mechanisms have been considered. The first type of mechanism, limited to a static framework where the utilities are measured in monetary units and are transferable, consists of fixing monetary transfer schemes among the players. They will be examined in the next section. The second type of mechanism, studied in Section 4, requires a dynamic framework and consists of repeating the elementary game: Repetition itself will form the enforcement mechanism.
The elementary game just described encompasses (in discrete terms) several models already extensively analyzed in the literature. One example is the partnership model, as analyzed by Holmstrom (1982) , in which each agent supplies an unobservable input to a (deterministic or stochastic) production process, and the output is shared by the team. Another example is given by Green and Porter (1984) , oligopoly model, in which firms' output levels are not publicly observable and the market price is a stochastic function of total output. A third example is the classic subscription game for the (stochastic or deterministic) provision of a public good: Every individual subscribes some monetary amount and the total is devoted to covering the cost of a public good (e.g., see Laffont, 1988) . A last example is given by the design of international treaties on environmental issues (e.g., see Mäler, 1990; d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1992) , in which the outcomes are states of the natural environment and in which the individual utilities can be decomposed into two parts, the abatement cost (of taking an action) and the damage cost associated with the state of the environment and resulting from all individual actions.
Transfer schemes
3.1 A necessary and sufficient condition to enforce full sharing of the surplus Let us first consider the static interpretation of the framework and assume that the agents have quasi-linear utility functions: There is a good, playing the role of money, which is transferable without any restrictions, and the utilities are measured in units of that good. Under the transferability assumption, a mixed action profile α * is collectively efficient if and only if the following requirement holds:
In the design of an incentive mechanism to enforce a desired mixed action profile α * , we shall not restrict our attention to the case in which it is efficient. However, assuming that every agent has an outside option giving a utility level normalized to 0, we shall always consider that α * produces a nonnegative (resp. positive) total surplus, that is,
An important advantage of the transferability assumption is to reduce the mechanism design to the solving of a system of linear inequalities defining an appropriate transfer scheme. A transfer scheme is a function t : X → Re n transforming the elementary game into a "new game," with payoff functions given by
and strategy spaces still given by {A i }. Such a transfer scheme should be designed to get α * as a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game: It should satisfy the following set of linear incentive compatibility constraints:
The mixed action profile α * is then said to be enforceable. In addition, for feasibility, the surplus generated should be "fully shared" within the team. In other words, the transfer scheme should satisfy the budget-balancing linear equalities
This is a strong property but indispensable to close the model. Weaker restrictions could allow some outside distribution of the surplus (e.g., to the owners, if it is a firm, as suggested by Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982) . Alternatively, one could impose budget-balancing only in expected value terms with respect to the stochastic outcome function p(· | α * ), but this would then imply the intervention of some outside party ensuring ex post feasibility.
x∈X i∈N
A last property is that every agent be given at least the incentives to participate: The transfer scheme should satisfy additional linear inequalities, the so-called individual rationality constraints
The problem of finding, for a given action profile α, a transfer scheme satisfying this set of incentive and feasibility constraints defines the "partnership problem." The "linear approach" to the problem consists of taking this set as a system of linear inequalities in t and applying standard results about the consistency of such systems. 6 To illustrate let us prove the following lemma, which is a simple "theorem of the alternative" applied to the problem, and which will be used repeatedly in the sequel. 7 6. As mentioned in the Introduction, such a technique was first used to solve the team adverse selection problem, both in the finite and in the infinite case. In both cases, results such as given in Fan (1956) can be used. In the infinite case, though, for topological reasons, only ε-Bayesian incentive compatibility is obtained (d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1982) . Such a technique was first used to solve the team moral hazard problem by Legros (1989) and Matsushima (1989a) . 7. Such a lemma is also proved in Legros and Matsushima (1991) .
Lemma 1 Consider any utility profile {u i }. Any mixed action profile α * producing nonnegative surplus is enforceable by a budget-balancing and individually rational transfer scheme t ∈ × n i=1 Re X if and only if: For every λ ∈ × n i=1 Re
we must have
Proof We have to solve the following system of linear inequalities in t ∈ Re nX :
By standard results, its consistency is equivalent to: For every λ ∈ × n i=1 Re
To show the converse, observe that (1) implies (A1). Indeed (1) implies that, for some κ ∈ Re X ,
, which leads to (A1) by posing µ ≡ κ and γ i = 0. Then (A2) coincides with (2), and the result follows.
From the proof of Lemma 1, it appears that individual rationality does not represent an effective restriction. This is also established directly by Legros and Matsushima (1991) , who obtain individual rationality for any given utility profile {u i } and any action profile α * producing nonnegative surplus, as soon as the action profile is enforceable by a budget-balancing transfer scheme t. Indeed, for any sharing coefficients {δ i }, with δ i ≥ 0 and n i=1 δ i = 1, it suffices to construct the new transfer scheme t , such that,
By construction, this new transfer scheme satisfies individual rationality, is still budget-balancing and maintains incentive compatibility (since it amounts to adding a term constant in a i ).
It is important to notice that the condition given in Lemma 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition and that it restricts, unseparably, both the outcome function p(· | ·) and the utility profile {u i }. Legros and Matsushima (1991) use such a lemma to derive an alternative, somewhat more interpretable, necessary and sufficient condition, but still restricting unseparably both the outcome function and the utility profile. They first construct a measure β of the "likelihood of a deviation" with respect to some (efficient) pure action profile a * as
. Then the alternative condition, necessary and sufficient to have a * enforceable by a budget-balancing and individually rational transfer scheme, is that 8
For the specification of both this necessary and sufficient condition and the one given by Lemma 1, a crucial restriction is the budget-balancing condition (BB). If we replace (BB) by the weaker restriction of expected-budget-balancing (EB), then, using an argument similar to the one of Lemma 1, we get 9
Theorem 1 For any utility profile {u i }, any efficient pure action profile a * producing nonnegative surplus is enforceable by an individually rational, expected-budget-balancing transfer scheme.
Proof To solve the system of inequalities and equalities in t ∈ Re nX , defined by (IC), (IR) and (EB), we consider, as in the proof of Lemma 1, the corresponding dual conditions: For every
+ , every µ ∈ Re, and every γ ∈ Re N + such that
8. Legros and Matsushima (1991, Theorem 2) . 9. The analogue to this theorem for the adverse selection case is Theorem 10 in d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982) .
By efficiency we may write
This last expression is null by (6). Finally, since
we get (5).
In this proof, efficiency of the chosen pure action profile is essential. It shows that allowing the budget to balance only in expected value is a way to solve the moral hazard problem, but relying on some (unspecified) external agency to ensure ex post feasibility.
Returning to the strong budget-balancing property, we shall now take another route and use Lemma 1 to analyze alternative sufficient conditions imposed only on the stochastic outcome function, independently from any restriction imposed on the utility profile. For that purpose, as mentioned in the introduction, we distinguish two kinds of conditions among those introduced in the literature. One kind will include conditions sufficient to enforce any efficient pure actions and stronger conditions, sufficient to enforce any actions (efficient or not). The other kind will only be enough to obtain approximate efficiency via mixed actions.
Sufficient conditions of the first kind: enforcing efficient actions
The first condition that we define will be shown to be sufficient to enforce any efficient pure action profile a * . This is simply an analogue to the "compatibility condition" initially introduced to solve the team adverse selection problem. 10 However, it has never been considered in the team moral hazard problem, and it will turn out to be the weakest of its kind (among those that have appeared in the literature).
A mixed action profile α * is compatible with
+ such that (1) of Lemma 1 holds, we have
Then the condition to be imposed on the stochastic outcome function p(· | ·) is simply stated as:
Compatibility Condition (C*). Any pure action profile a * ∈ A is compatible with p(· | ·).
We let also C * = ∩ a * C a * denote the subset of all stochastic outcome functions p(· | ·) satisfying the compatibility condition. We shall see below various ways to interpret this condition. But, using Lemma 1, we immediately obtain:
Theorem 2 Suppose C* holds. For any utility profile {u i }, any efficient pure action profile a * producing nonnegative surplus is enforceable by an individually rational and budget-balancing transfer scheme, i.e., satisfying (IC), (IR) and (BB).
Proof Take any utility profile {u i } and efficient pure action profile a * producing a nonnegative surplus. If, for λ ∈ × n i=1 Re A i + , (1) in Lemma 1 holds, then C* implies (2*). Using efficiency as in the proof of Theorem 1 (inequality (7)), we get (2).
Observe that in this theorem, based on C*, the utility profile is not restricted (except that it should produce nonnegative surplus). However, only efficient pure action profile can be enforced as required. As shown in d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1992) ; d 'Aspremont et al. (1997) , for its adverse selection analogue, condition C* can be expressed equivalently in "primal" terms, leading to an alternative proof of Theorem 2. Indeed, condition C* is equivalent to 11 Condition C. ∀ a * ∈ A, ∀ p ∈ Re X , ∃ t ∈ Re nX such that i t i (x) = ρ(x), and
This condition is easy to interpret. It means that, for any given budget, and the identically zero utility profile, any joint action profile should be enforceable by a transfer scheme balancing this budget. Then, an alternative way to prove Theorem 1 is to start by constructing transfers of the Clarke-Groves-Vickrey type by letting, relative to the given utility profile {u i } and the efficient action profile a * (producing nonnegative surplus),
Efficiency implies that the (IC)-constraints are satisfied but that the budget-balancing constraint might be broken. However, taking ρ(·) ≡ − i t 0 i (·), and applying Condition C, there is a transfer scheme t satisfying all equalities and inequalities listed in the condition. Then, defining t * ≡ t 0 + t, we get budget-balancing while preserving incentive compatibility. Finally, to ensure individual rationality, we may apply the construction given by (3) above. Fudenberg et al. (1994) -hereafter denoted FLM -introduce a stronger condition. It is more restrictive than condition C* (as we will see in Theorem 3), but leads to an alternative interpretation of it. To state this other condition we need additional notation. Consider a mixed action profile α ∈Â and, for every i, j ∈ N , the following matrices, of dimension |A i | × |X|, |A j | × |X|, and (|A i | + |A j |) × |X|, respectively:
A mixed action profile α is said to be pairwise identifiable for i and j whenever the rank of matrix
We can now state FLM's condition:
Pairwise Identifiability (PI). For every pair i, j in N , every pure action profile a in A is pairwise identifiable for i and j.
The idea of pairwise identifiability of an action profile is that the probability distributions, induced by one player's deviating mixed action, be distinguishable from the probability distributions induced by some other player's deviation, in order to avoid that "the two players' deviations cannot be distinguished statistically" (see FLM). A similar interpretation can be given to the compatibility condition, since, whenever violated for some action profile a * , it leads to the existence of a profile of (deviating) mixed actions 12 λ such that, for any pair i, j and any a i , a j ,
For every player i, the probability distribution induced by the deviation λ i is different from the one induced by a * i , but undistinguishable from the probability distributions induced by any other player's deviation. The logical relation between pairwise identifiability and compatibility is precisely established by the following.
Theorem 3 For a stochastic outcome function p(· | ·), the mixed action profile α is pairwise identifiable for some pair i, j ∈ N if and only if α is compatible with p(· | ·).
Proof To prove the "only if" part, assume that (1) holds (with α * = α) and that, for some i, j, rank
solving the following homogeneous system:
It implies, by summation over x, that λ = a i λ i (a i ) − a j λ j (a j ). In matrix notation it becomes Π ij (α)λ = 0, withΠ
the corresponding |X| × (|A i | + |A j | + 1) matrix. Since the last column (−p(· | α)) can be written as
To show that α is compatible with p(· | ·), we need to show that (2*) holds. In fact, using (1), it is enough to show that the following two subsystems can be solved, respectively, in λ i = (λ i (a i )) a i and λ i (implying that λ i = a i λ i (a i )), and in λ j = (λ j (a j )) a j and λ j (implying that λ j = − a j λ j (a j )). The first is given by
12. The normalization to 1 of a i λi(ai) is obtained without loss of generality since Condition C* imposes no value for every λi(a * i ). 
Thus, defining two subspaces of KerΠ ij (α),
we get that KerΠ ij (α) = K i K j . In other terms, if λ ∈ KerΠ ij (α), then λ can be decomposed uniquely into the sum of
. By (1), this is enough to get (2*).
To prove the converse (the "if" part), it is enough now to observe that if
for some pair i, j, then there is some λ ∈ KerΠ ij (α) which can be decomposed in such a way that,
This result leads to still another way to state condition C*: For every pure action profile a * , there exists a pair of players for which a * is pairwise identifiable. Also, that PI implies C* is an immediate consequence of the "only if" part of this theorem:
However it should be stressed that C* is effectively weaker than PI (which is a condition imposed to all pairs of players), since there are meaningful cases where the first holds and not the second. Consider the following class of stochastic outcome functions having a "product structure." 13 To illustrate, suppose there are four partners and that any outcome x in X is decomposable into two statistically independent components, the first component being influenced by the actions of the first two partners, the second by the actions of the other two: x = (y, z) ∈ Y × Z = X and p(x | a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ) = q(y | a 1 , a 2 )r(x | a 3 , a 4 ).
13. For results using such a structure see, e.g., Holmstrom (1982) , Radner (1985) , and Fudenberg et al. (1994) .
For any given a * and i, j = 1, 2, i = j, rank(Π i (a * −i )) = rank(Q i (a * j )) and rank(Q 12 (a * 1 , a * 2 )) = rank(Π 12 (a * )). If, on the one hand, we assume that q does not satisfy PI, because
2 )), so that p does not satisfy PI either. On the other hand, if we assume that r satisfies Condition C, then, for any ρ : Y × Z → Re and any y ∈ Y , there is t y : Z → Re 4 such that t
for any i, j = 3, 4, i = j, and any a i ∈ A i . Multiplying each side by q(y | a * 1 , a * 2 ) and summing over y, we get that p satisfies Condition C. Therefore the product stochastic outcome function as constructed satisfies Condition C but not PI.
Enforcement without using efficiency
Up to now we have concentrated our efforts on the enforcement of efficient action profiles, and efficiency was used in the argument to get incentive compatibility. However, there might be reasons for which some actions must be chosen that are not efficient for the team. For example, the team might be embedded in a larger community and the recommended actions might be the ones corresponding to efficient actions for the whole community, taking into account all external effects. This raises the issue whether it is possible to ensure the enforceability of any action profile (efficient or not from the team point of view) by a budget-balancing and individually rational transfer scheme. We then need to impose a stronger restriction on the stochastic outcome function. By analogy with the adverse selection case, 14 we propose:
Condition B. ∀ a * ∈ A, ∃ t ∈ Re nX such that
Suppose Condition B holds. Then for any utility profile {u i } we can multiply the given transfer scheme t by an arbitrarily large positive number M and obtain
14. This condition was introduced in d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982) . It was adapted to the moral hazard problem by Matsushima (1989b) . See also Legros and Matsushima (1991) .
So the transfer scheme M t satisfies (IC) and (BB). Also, by the construction given in (3), we get a transfer scheme t satisfying (IC), (BB), and (IR). Moreover, the converse holds. It is enough to consider the utility profile where u i ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N . Then (BB) and (IC) (holding strictly) imply Condition B. We have thus proved the following:
Theorem 4 Condition B holds if and only if, for any utility profile {u i } and any a * producing nonnegative surplus, a * is strictly enforceable (IC), with all inequalities strict) by a budget-balancing (BB) and individually rational (IR) transfer scheme.
Obviously the same theorem holds for the case 15 where each u i depends directly on the actions of all players (u i = u i (x, a) ), although logically, neither version of the theorem is stronger than the other. Indeed for one direction the condition allows us to wipe out any counterincentive effect due to the utilities. In the other direction, the argument is based on the identically null utility profile.
Let B a * denote the set of outcome functions p(· | ·) such that the system defined by (1), with α * = a * , admits only solutions where, ∀ i, λ i (a i ) = 0, if a i = a * i . The dual version of Condition B is then:
Condition B*. For any pure action profile a * ∈ A, p(· | ·) ∈ B a * .
Thus Condition B* (or B) is stronger than Condition C* (or C), but entails (and is even equivalent to) enforceability of all action profiles by budget-balancing, individually rational transfer schemes. Clearly such conditions require that the set X of observable outcomes be of sufficient size with respect to the sets of actions. More formally, if the cardinality of X is large enough, relative to the number of actions available to some partners, the set B* of all stochastic outcome functions satisfying B, and hence the larger set C*, are very large indeed: They contain an open and dense subset of all stochastic outcome functions. That is, Conditions B and C are generic. 16 Theorem 5 Assuming that there exists a pair i, j ∈ N such that |X| ≥ |A i | + |A j | − 1 ≥ 2, Conditions B and C hold generically.
Proof For i, j ∈ N and a * ∈ A, assuming |X| ≥ |A i | + |A j | − 1, the matrix defining the homogeneous system (1) 
Sufficient conditions of the second kind
Although the compatibility condition is generic, and weaker than both pairwise identifiability and Condition B, there are still many meaningful cases where it is not satisfied. For instance, an important case is the one where
with g(· | r) = g(· | r ) whenever r = r . In this case, for any a * ∈ A such that 0 ≤ a * j − a * 1 < K, ∀ j = 1, it is possible to find a ∈ A satisfying (a j − a * j ) = (a 1 − a * 1 ) = 0, so that, ∀ j = 1,
Notice this set of action profiles includes more than the symmetric profiles, where each player uses the same action. Also, letting λ j (a j ) = λ 1 (a 1 ) = 0, ∀ j = 1, and λ j (a j ) = 0, ∀ j, ∀ a j = a j , we see that Condition C* is violated: (1) holds but not (2*).
An example of such a case is given by the classical subscription game for the production of a public good (assuming transferable utilities), where the only actions are subscriptions in some private good made by the consumers and where the total amount subscribed is used as an input to produce the public good. Another example is the discretized version of the stochastic Cournot oligopoly model of Green and Porter (1984) , where, to obtain the collusive outcome, the actions are the quantities to be produced and the market price is a function of the total quantity.
Because the compatibility condition does not hold in such models, one may look, as is done by FLM, for conditions of another kind, enforcing only approximate efficiency for the partnership, i.e., such conditions are sufficient to enforce a mixed action profile arbitrarily close to some efficient profile.
We need some definitions. First, a mixed action profile α is said to be nearly-efficient for ε > 0 if max a∈A i∈N
Second, FLM define a mixed action profile α to have pairwise full rank for a pair i, j of players, whenever the rank of the matrix Π ij (α) is equal to |A i | + |A j | − 1. They have the following condition (FLM, Condition 6.2):
Local Pairwise Full Rank (LPF). For every pair i, j ∈ N , there exists a mixed action profile α which has pairwise full rank.
This is a weak condition since it only restricts some mixed action profiles. As observed by FLM, this condition is the conjunction of two weaker conditions. One is to impose, for every pair i, j ∈ N , the existence of some mixed action profile α having pairwise identifiability. In fact we shall need only an even weaker condition, i.e., to impose the same property only to some pair of players. But, by Theorem 3, this is equivalent to having α compatible with p(· | ·).
Local Compatibility (LC). There exists a mixed action profile α which is compatible with p(· | ·).
The second weaker condition included in LPF is based on another property applying to a mixed action profile α, namely, to have individual full rank for i in the sense that the matrix Π i (α −i ) should have full rank. The condition is 18 :
Local Individual Full Rank (LIF). For every i ∈ N , there exists a mixed action profile α which has individual full rank for i.
Finally, using FLM Lemma 6.2, our Theorem 3 and Lemma 1, it is now possible to show that the conjunction of LC and LIF is sufficient to enforce nearly efficient mixed joint actions.
Theorem 6 Assume that LC and LIF hold. Then, for any utility profile {u i } and for any joint mixed action producing positive surplus (in particular, for any efficient pure joint action a * ), there is an arbitrarily close joint mixed action α * which is enforceable by an individually rational and budget-balancing transfer scheme, i.e., satisfying (IC), (IR), and (BB). Moreover for an efficient pure joint action a * an any ε > 0, α * may be chosen to be nearly efficient and produce positive surplus.
Proof First, by Theorem 3, LC is equivalent to the existence of some mixed action profile α having pairwise identifiability for some pair of players i, j. So, it may be shown that the conjunction of LC and LFI imply that there exists an open and dense set of mixed action profiles each of which is pairwise identifiable for this pair of players and has individual full rank for all players. The argument is the same as in Lemma 6.2 of FLM. Therefore, for any joint mixed action producing positive surplus, it implies that there exists an arbitrarily close joint mixed action α * (hence all producing positive surplus) which is pairwise identifiable for i, j and has individual full rank for all k ∈ N . Now use Lemma 1 for this α * and consider any λ ∈ × n i=1 Re A i + , λ = 0, satisfying (1). Because α * is pairwise identifiable for i, j we get by Theorem 3 (and (1)) that α * is compatible with p(· | ·):
Since α * has individual full rank for every k, every solution to these equations satisfies
so that (2) of Lemma 1 holds. Therefore α * is enforceable by an individually rational and budgetbalancing transfer scheme. If α * is chosen arbitrarily close to an efficient joint action a * producing positive surplus, then, for any ε > 0, we can take α * to be nearly efficient and to produce positive surplus. The result follows.
Repetition
The two kinds of conditions imposed on the stochastic outcome functions can also be used in a dynamic framework, in which the elementary (or stage) game is infinitely repeated and the total payoffs over time are discounted. In this framework, the purpose is to study the set of payoffs in the elementary game that can be attained, or nearly attained, as average discounted equilibrium payoffs in the infinitely repeated game, when the players are sufficiently patient (i.e., the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1). The assumption of quasi-linear utilities is thus not needed anymore, since immediate transfers in the basic game can be replaced by intertemporal transfers, realized along the equilibrium path in the repeated game. FLM base their analysis on two conditions: pairwise identifiability and pairwise full rank. We show in this section that their results can be generalized using, respectively, the compatibility condition and the conjunction of local compatibility with local individual full rank. The repeated game is constructed as follows. At each stage t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞ and for each player i, the action space is given by {A i } and the payoff function given by U i (a i ) = x u i (x, a i )p(x | a), the payoff of the elementary game. At each stage, the game results in an outcome x t ∈ X which is publicly observable. Also, only the outcome (and not the others' actions) is observed by each agent at each stage. A public history at stage t is a sequence (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t−1 ) in X t = X × . . . × X and a public strategy σ i is an infinite sequence σ 1 i , σ 2 i , . . . , σ t i , . . . , σ ∞ i , where every σ t i is a map from the set of all public histories at stage t toÂ i : for any sequence (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t−1 ) in X t , σ t i (· | x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t−1 ) is a mixed action of player i. A vector of public strategies σ induces a probability distribution over the set of public histories at stage t, allowing to define the expected payoff of agent i at stage t, which we denote by U t i (σ). Then, given a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), the payoff of agent i in the repeated game is defined as the payoff (1 − δ)
Because of the factor (1 − δ), this is an "average payoff per period," comparable to the stage game payoff. The equilibrium concept used by FLM is the perfect public equilibrium (PPE). It is a vector of public strategies σ such that, for each t = 0, 1, . . ., and for each public history (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t−1 ) in X t , the continuation of these strategies, from stage t on, forms a Nash equilibrium of the remaining game. Since, when the other agents use public strategies, no agent can gain by playing a nonpublic strategy and the beliefs about the others' past actions are irrelevant, a PPE is a true perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The set of discounted average payoff vectors that correspond to PPEs, for a discount factor δ, is denoted E(δ). Also, in the stage game, because there is a finite number of pure joint actions, the set of payoff vectors generated by all joint mixed actions is a polytope in Re N . Hence a joint mixed action α * is Pareto efficient if and only if α * ∈ argmax α i∈N β i U i (α), for some β = (β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β N ) 0. Even restricting to public strategies, FLM get "folk theorems" for the infinitely repeated game. This is to show that "large sets" of payoff vectors of the stage game, including nearly efficient ones, can be attained through repetition as perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game, at least when the players are sufficiently patient. Consider any Nash equilibrium α 0 ∈Â of the stage game, with corresponding payoff vector v 0 ≡ (U 1 (α 0 ), . . . , U n (α 0 )). We shall take as a "large set" of payoff vectors to be attained 19 the set V 0 which is the convex hull of v 0 and all the Pareto-efficient payoff vectors in the stage game Pareto-dominating v 0 . V 0 is a polytope generated 19. A stronger version of the folk theorem corresponds to taking as the large set of payoff vectors to be attained (or nearly attained) the set of all payoff vectors that are above the min-max payoff vector. This would require stronger assumptions, such as Condition 6.3 in FLM (see Footnote 18 here above).
by v 0 and all payoff vectors, say v k , k = 1, 2, . . . , K, corresponding to Pareto-efficient pure action profiles, a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a K . V 0 is assumed to have a nonempty interior. The method for constructing, in the repeated game, PPE's giving discounted average payoff vectors that are in the set V 0 for some discount factor δ, relies on the dynamic-programming decomposition of equilibrium payoffs into "current" and "continuation" payoffs, as in Abreu et al. (1986) . More precisely, a payoff vector v ∈ Re n is said to be decomposable for a subset W ⊂ Re n , a discount factor δ and a mixed action profile α * , if there exists a set of (continuation) payoff vectors w(·) ∈ Re nX such that w(x) ∈ W ∀ x ∈ X and, ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ a i ∈ A i ,
In the following theorem, it will be enough to restrict to W 's that are regular hyperplanes {w ∈ Re n | i b i w i = c}, with b i > 0 for all i. This will allow us to rely on the analogy between the problem of finding continuation payoffs satisfying these inequalities (including the constraint w(x) ∈ W , ∀ x ∈ X) for a mixed action profile α * ∈ A and the problem of finding transfer schemes to enforce α * (including the budget balancing constraint) as considered in the previous sections. Indeed, it amounts to replacing, in the (BB)-constraints, each FLM define a subset V ⊂ Re n to be locally self-decomposable if, for each v ∈ V , there is a δ ∈ [0, 1) and an open set W containing v such that every u ∈ V ∩ W is decomposable for V itself, for δ and some mixed action profile α * . We shall need the following result (FLM, Lemma 4.2), where E(δ) denotes the set of discounted average payoff vectors resulting from PPEs in the infinitely repeated game with discount factor δ.
Proof By Lemma 2, and because V 0Under conditions LC and LIF, the above argument must be modified only for points in P 0 θ . Take any such point v and consider the line starting from ω and going through v and cutting V 0 at a point v . The line segment (w, v) is in Interior V 0 θ . So, there exists a point u arbitrarily close to the line segment (v, v ) and decomposable for the hyperplane {w ∈ Re n | i β k i w i = 0}, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), and for a joint mixed action α. And, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) and u in the interior of V 0 θ such that v = (1 − δ)u + δu . Again, given this δ, there exists a neighborhood W of v such that, for every u ∈ V 0 θ ∩ W , u = (1 − δ)u + δu , for some u ∈ V 0 θ , so that, by the same argument as above, u is decomposable for V 0 θ , δ, and α. The result follows.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed several conditions to be imposed on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships. Their logical relationship has been explored. We have distinguished two kinds of conditions. However, the property for an action profile to be "compatible" plays a crucial role in both kinds of conditions. In so doing, we have illustrated the fruitfulness of transporting belief restrictions used under adverse selection to the stochastic outcome functions in team moral hazard. Another lesson carried out by this paper is the importance of weakening efficiency into near-efficiency and of the use of mixed strategies. Then, only conditions of the second kind are required. These are "local conditions," i.e., applying to a single mixed action profile. They have been used for two types of enforcement mechanisms: for static enforcement via transfer schemes and for dynamic enforcement through repetition. For the first type, these conditions allow us to solve approximately problems that have "too much symmetry," such as collusion in stochastic Cournot oligopoly or efficiency in the subscription equilibrium for public goods, which cannot be solved by conditions of the first kind. With the second type, any payoff on the Pareto frontier can be approximated as a noncooperative equilibrium of the supergame.
